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ABSTRACT 
Many organizations, especially in emerging economies, trace their origins to restructured state 
enterprises and this study explores the implications of such origins for organizational adaptation 
to changing environmental conditions. We compare the activity choices and survival chances of 
spin-offs from restructured state enterprises with those of de novo organizations. We argue that 
prior shared experience of spin-offs’ managers and employees facilitates the redeployment of 
routines developed in parent state enterprises. This should predispose spin-offs to pursue familiar 
activities, but this choice is not completely predetermined and its survival implications depend on 
the environmental conditions. Our empirical findings suggest that spin-offs from restructured state 
enterprises are less likely to engage in the new activities than de novo organizations. However, 
those restructuring spin-offs that do engage in the new activities before the regulatory regime shift 
significantly improve their survival chances after the shift. Moreover, we find that the detrimental 
effect of the regulatory regime shift and the beneficial effect of engaging in new activities are 
stronger for spin-offs from restructured state enterprises than for de novo organizations. 
 
Keywords: State enterprises, Regulatory regime shift, Organizational origins, Prior shared 
experience, Organizational activities, Restructuring spin-offs 
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LEGACY OF THE STATE: PRIOR SHARED EXPERIENCE AND SURVIVAL  
OF SPIN-OFFS FROM RESTRUCTURED STATE ENTERPRISES 
 
The effect of organizational origins on survival has been the focus of a growing number 
of studies in recent years (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Chen et al., 2012; Geroski et al., 2010). 
Previous work has demonstrated that the ways organizations are created may be associated with 
advantages and disadvantages that can last over the organizations’ entire life-cycle. A number of 
studies investigated these advantages and disadvantages by comparing new ventures created 
from scratch with ventures established as spin-offs from existing organizations (e.g., Klepper & 
Sleeper, 2005; Phillips, 2002; Shane & Stuart, 2002).  
Ventures established as spin-offs often originate from organizations that were previously 
owned by the state (Oertel, Thommes, & Walgenbach, 2016; Suhomlinova, 1999; Woolley, 
2017). Over the last several decades, privatization waves in the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, 
China, Russia, and countries of Central and Eastern Europe created thousands of new ventures 
by restructuring local state-owned enterprises (Megginson & Netter, 2001). State-owned 
enterprises were usually inefficient, too large, and possessed limited innovative capabilities 
(Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000). To address these organizational and the resulting 
macroeconomic problems, governments often decided to restructure the large state-owned 
enterprises by splitting them into multiple legal entities that were subsequently privatized 
(Suhomlinova, 1999; Xu, Tihanyi, & Hitt, 2017).1  
The implications of creating new organizations from restructured state enterprises have 
received rather limited attention to date (Sedaitis, 1998; Woolley, 2017). To better understand 
the strategic choices made by spin-offs from restructured state enterprises, we rely on recent 
literature that highlights the importance of prior shared work experience (Autio, George, & 
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Alexy, 2011; Fern, Cardinal, & O’Neill, 2012; Zheng, Devaughn, & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2016). 
Viewed from this perspective, spin-offs from restructured state enterprises are expected to make 
strategic choices that reflect the prior shared experience of their organizational members. To 
investigate the implications of prior shared work experience in state enterprises, we pose the 
following research question: How does prior shared experience affect activities of spin-offs 
originating from restructured state enterprises and the ability of these spin-offs to adapt to 
changing environmental conditions? To answer this question, we examine systematic differences 
between spin-offs from restructured state enterprises and newly-established (de novo) 
organizations in their activity choices and survival rates before and after a major change in the 
regulatory environment. 
We refer to the new organizations created as a result of restructuring of state enterprises 
as “restructuring spin-offs” (Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003). Unlike entrepreneurial ventures 
created to exploit new technologies, new market niches, or new business models (Narayanan et 
al., 2009), these restructuring spin-offs are created in the privatization process driven by the 
government goals. We argue that restructuring spin-offs inherit organizational routines 
developed through prior shared experience of their managers and employees. This prior shared 
experience predisposes organizations to engage in familiar activities that can be performed by 
relying on the inherited routines. We build on the transactive memory systems (TMS) theory 
(Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005; Peltokorpi, 2008; Ren & Argote, 
2011; Wegner, 1987) to explain how prior shared experience affects the activity choices of 
restructuring spin-offs and to investigate the survival implications of such activity choices.  
Market reforms in transition economies tend to be associated with a large-scale 
restructuring of state enterprises and, at the same time, with massive founding of de novo 
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organizations (Estrin, Meyer, & Bytchkova, 2005; Lyles, Saxton, & Watson, 2004; Wachtel, 
1999). The emergence of a large number of diverse organizations over a relatively short period 
of time provides an opportunity to compare organizations with and without pre-founding 
experience. Our empirical analysis is focused on commercial banks during the market reforms in 
Russia when the restructuring spin-offs from the Soviet-era banks leveraged their pre-founding 
experience to compete against de novo banks created from scratch. Our observation period from 
1988 to 2002 enables us to analyze the banking industry before and after major changes in the 
regulatory environment that occurred in 1995 when the Russian government moved from laissez-
faire policies to tight regulation and hard budget constraints.  
Our study makes a contribution to the literature by demonstrating that the “legacy of the 
state” is particularly strong in those organizations where managers and employees share 
collective experience of working for state enterprises. We also advance the literature on 
organizational origins by showing how prior shared experience can boost or hamper survival 
chances depending on environmental conditions. Furthermore, our results suggest that the risks 
associated with prior shared experience are more pronounced when organizational founding is 
not motivated by the intent to engage in new activities. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Previous studies suggest that the prior experience of founders strongly influences their 
choices in running new ventures and the success of these ventures. The importance of prior 
experience was often attributed to knowledge and capabilities acquired as a result of such 
experience (Agarwal et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2012; Dencker et al., 2009; Helfat & 
Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). One stream within this literature emphasized the 
critical role played by collective or shared experience in the development of knowledge and 
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capabilities (Agarwal et al., 2016; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Ganco, 2013). Researchers 
pointed out that prior individual experiences may not be sufficient for the transfer of capabilities 
to new organizations because these capabilities are grounded in routines performed by teams and 
prior shared experience of team members is critical for successful reproduction of these routines 
in another organization (Fern et al., 2012; Reagans, Argote, & Brooks, 2005; Wezel et al., 2006).  
Whereas previous studies explained the importance of prior shared experience from the 
knowledge-based perspective (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2016; Ganco, 2013), useful insights can also 
be drawn from psychological theories about collective cognitive processes. To explain how 
collective or shared knowledge is accumulated, stored, transferred, and deployed by people 
working together, psychologists studying cognitive processes in social groups use concepts of 
team mental models (Edwards et al., 2006; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu et al., 2000; 
Mohammed et al., 2010) and TMS (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Peltokorpi, 2008; 
Wegner, 1987). These concepts emphasize the importance of interpersonal interactions in the 
processes of developing and deploying collective cognitive structures. The concept of TMS, in 
particular, has been embraced by management scholars to emphasize the interactive nature of 
knowledge accumulation and maintenance in organizations (Ren & Argote, 2011). For example, 
Hecker (2012) suggests TMS as a theoretical framework that captures distinctive characteristics 
of knowledge shared among organizational members. Miller et al (2014) and Argote and Guo 
(2016) conclude that the development of organizational routines is associated with TMS.  
The idea that interactive cognitive processes represent a critical aspect of prior shared 
experience goes back to the management classics. According to Penrose, “An administrative 
group is something more than a collection of individuals; it is a collection of individuals who 
have had experience in working together… Extensive planning requires the cooperation of many 
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individuals and this requires knowledge of each other” (1959: 46-47).  Similarly, Nelson and 
Winter argued: “To view organizational memory as reducible to individual member memories is 
to overlook, or undervalue, the linking of those individual memories by shared experiences in the 
past, experiences that have established the extremely detailed and specific communication 
system that underlies routine performance.” (1982: 105).  
More recently, collective cognition as a critical aspect of prior shared experience has 
been emphasized by Berman et al. (2002), Kor (2003), Beckman (2006) and Zheng et al (2016). 
Among the studies that attribute the effects of prior shared experience to collective cognitive 
processes, some describe these processes using the concept of TMS (e.g., Ren & Argote, 2011; 
Zheng, 2012) and others employ the concepts of shared mental models, collective mind, or 
distributed tacit knowledge (e.g., Beckman, 2006; Berman et al., 2002). Despite terminological 
differences, these studies rely on the same explanatory logic emphasizing collective cognitive 
processes as a critical aspect of prior shared experience. We use the concept of TMS because it 
has emerged as a dominant concept in the research on shared knowledge (Argote & Guo, 2016; 
Hecker, 2012) and because it effectively captures the cognitive and interactive aspects of prior 
shared experience.  
 TMS are defined as “the shared division of cognitive labor with respect to the encoding, 
storage, retrieval, and communication of information from different knowledge domains, which 
often develops in close relationships” (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004: 633). TMS are created as 
a result of interactions among group members as they learn “who knows what” (Peltokorpi, 
2008; Ren & Argote, 2011; Wegner, 1987). Effective performance of organizational routines 
requires the development of TMS because the execution of most routines requires joint 
participation by multiple employees who rely on their shared knowledge and experience. 
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Researchers have emphasized the importance of cognitive and interactive aspects of routines 
(Becker, 2004) and recent publications demonstrate how the concept of TMS helps us better 
understand these cognitive and interactive aspects of organizational routines (Argote & Guo, 
2016; Miller et al., 2014). When an organizational unit becomes a stand-alone organization, 
employees who worked together in the parent organization tend to preserve TMS that facilitate 
the effective execution of routines in spin-off organizations. This creates a tendency to engage in 
activities that can be performed by relying on familiar routines.  
Activities are complex combinations of routines. Some routines may be unique for a 
given activity while other routines are used in several activities. For example, extending loans to 
private enterprises is an activity based on routines, such as reading a balance sheet or calculating 
appropriate interest rates to be charged. Some organizations may engage mostly in activities that 
leverage familiar routines while other organizations may engage in new activities and thus have 
to develop new routines. Even though organizational origins may predispose organizations to 
engage in particular activities, the choice of activities is not completely predetermined, and it is 
particularly interesting to study the survival implications of deviating from the choice of 
activities associated with certain organizational origins. In this paper, we explain how 
organizational origins and prior shared experience affect the choice of activities and consider the 
implications of this choice for organizational survival. 
Since organizational survival depends on a fit between the organization and the 
environment, it is important to examine how the survival consequences of particular 
organizational origins may be affected by a significant environmental change (Chen et al., 2012; 
Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). We anticipate that the survival implications of the activity choices 
would be contingent upon environmental conditions and would ultimately depend on the extent 
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to which specific activities promote the fit between the organization and its environment. We are 
particularly interested in the effect of a permanent shift2 in the environmental conditions that is 
produced by substantial changes in the regulatory regime (Haveman et al., 2001).   
Restructuring of state enterprises is often triggered by market reforms that also bring 
major changes in the institutional environment. Some studies consider market reforms as an 
undifferentiated period of institutional turbulence (e.g., Newman, 2000). However, a finer-
grained analysis would show the distinct stages of the reform process. Usually market reforms 
start with dismantling of the existing institutions, a process during which the elaborate 
mechanism of centralized coordination of transactions among economic actors is disabled and 
these economic actors are set free to choose transaction partners as well as contractual 
conditions. Early studies of market reforms usually focused on the process of market 
liberalization and on the consequences of dismantling the system of centralized coordination of 
economic activities (e.g., Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994; Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 
1992). The next stage of market reforms becomes the development of institutions that regulate 
interactions among market participants (Kogut & Spicer, 2002). Both processes – dismantling of 
old rules and development of new rules – can be implemented gradually or abruptly (Spicer, 
McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). In this study, we focus on abrupt changes in the regulatory 
environment associated with the introduction of new regulations after the initial period of market 
liberalization. We argue that the survival implications of organizational origins will be 
moderated by the regulatory regime shift, because major regulatory changes create more 
challenges for organizations of particular origins. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Employees of spin-offs often have shared experience of working together for the parent 
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organization. In the case of spin-offs operating in the parent organization’s industry, we can 
speak of industry-specific prior shared experience (Fern et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2016). This 
concept emphasizes two conditions: (1) a group of employees used to work together (shared 
experience), and (2) this group used to work together in the same industry, in which it works 
currently (industry-specific experience). In contrast, employees of de novo organizations may 
have individual industry-specific experiences but they usually lack the shared experience or they 
may have such shared experience acquired in another industry.  
The theory of TMS clarifies why shared experience is qualitatively different from 
individual experience. Shared experience enables the development of collective cognitive models 
that facilitate interpersonal coordination required for the effective execution of organizational 
routines. If individuals with shared experience continue working together, their TMS is 
preserved. If these individuals join different organizations, their individual experiences would 
not match the experiences of new co-workers and a new TMS would have to be developed.  
Since restructuring spin-offs possess industry-specific prior shared experience, they can 
redeploy TMS developed in their parent organizations. Through TMS that “facilitate access to a 
library of pre-existing behavioral routines or knowledge” (Zheng & Mai, 2013: 201-202), prior 
shared experience enhances organizational ability to execute familiar routines. Proficiency in 
executing familiar routines predisposes spin-offs to engage in the activities that are similar to 
those performed by their parent state enterprises. We contrast these traditional activities that 
were performed by incumbent organizations in the past with new activities. Activities are new if 
most organizations in a given industry have very limited experience of performing them.3 
Restructuring spin-offs’ propensity to engage in traditional activities is buttressed by the 
tendency of organizational founders to “select a strategy element that reflects the team’s shared 
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experience and represents a tie to the team’s collective past” (Fern et al., 2012: 433). This 
propensity also reflects the fact that, as domain insiders, spin-off managers often “struggle to 
recognise and execute competence-destroying changes” (Furr, Cavarretta & Garg, 2012: 252). In 
contrast, de novo organizations lack industry-specific prior shared experience and will be less 
inclined to engage in traditional activities. Unlike spin-offs, de novo do not inherit TMS that can 
be leveraged by performing familiar activities. This would make de novo organizations more 
open to engaging in new activities. Furthermore, executives of de novo organizations often have 
experience outside the focal industry, and such experience facilitates exploration and 
experimentation. As “domain outsiders”, such executives can bring new ideas and identify 
promising opportunities and novel solutions (Furr et al., 2012). Previous studies reported that de 
novo organizations are more likely to engage in product innovation (Khessina, 2003) and learn 
by experimenting (Bradley et al., 2011). Based on these arguments, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 1. Spin-offs from restructured state enterprises are less likely to engage in 
new activities than de novo organizations. 
As we argued above, the survival implications of engaging in new activities will be 
contingent on environmental conditions. Restructuring spin-offs may benefit from pursuing 
activities similar to those performed by their parent organizations as long as the environmental 
conditions make those activities feasible and profitable. The relevance of prior shared experience 
is determined by conditions of the task environment. If the task environment does not change 
substantially, prior shared experience remains relevant and TMS developed through this 
experience remain instrumental (Zheng, 2012). At the same time, in the absence of substantial 
changes in the business environment, the tendency of de novo organizations to experiment with 
new activities will be associated with a higher risk of failure.  
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In line with the prior literature about the survival advantages associated with relevant pre-
founding experience (Agarwal et al., 2004; Dencker & Gruber, 2015; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; 
Klepper, 2009), we expect restructuring spin-offs to have lower mortality hazards than de novo 
organizations as long as activities similar to those performed by their parent organizations earlier 
remain relevant and profitable. This condition stems from our argument that prior shared 
experience and TMS predispose organizations to engage in familiar activities. Performing 
familiar activities is associated with lower risk and higher efficiency. Therefore, we expect 
restructuring spin-offs to have the survival advantages over de novo organizations before a 
regulatory regime shift: 
Hypothesis 2. Spin-offs from restructured state enterprises will have higher survival 
chances than de novo organizations before the regulatory regime shift. 
Enjoying success today may increase the risk of failure tomorrow if environmental 
conditions change. Previous success of an organization’s strategy makes it difficult to change 
strategic direction, the phenomenon called “co-evolutionary lock-in” (Burgelman, 2002). Perfect 
adaptation to a specific competitive landscape may be a drawback, because the organizations that 
have achieved a perfect fit with a particular environment tend to be at a disadvantage when the 
environment changes, as described in studies about “competency trap” (Barnett et al., 1994; 
Levitt & March, 1988). TMS developed through prior shared experience remain useful in similar 
task environments but become less relevant once task environments change (Brandon & 
Hollingshead, 2004; Zheng, 2012). In introducing Hypothesis 2, we argued that before the 
regulatory regime shift restructuring spin-offs can take advantage of relevant prior shared 
experience of their managers and employees. However, the task environment and, therefore, the 
relevance of collective cognitive models developed based on prior shared experience (Beckman, 
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2006; Berman et al., 2002; Kor, 2003) will change after the regulatory regime shift. Building on 
our arguments that the restructuring spin-offs are more likely to engage in familiar activities, and 
that the benefits of such activities decrease after a regulatory regime shift, we suggest that: 
Hypothesis 3. The regulatory regime shift will have a negative effect on the survival of 
spin-offs from restructured state enterprises. 
The effect of a regulatory regime shift on de novo organizations is more difficult to 
predict. We expect that the organizations without inherited routines are more likely to engage in 
new activities which, in turn, should facilitate adaptation to the changed environmental 
conditions (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Yet, even the organizations open 
to engaging in new activities may experience difficulties in adapting to a new environmental 
landscape after the shift (Bradley et al., 2011). Environmental changes create challenges as well 
as opportunities, and the nature of these changes will determine whether the detrimental effect of 
challenges on organizational survival will exceed the positive effect of opportunities. We argued 
earlier that TMS developed through prior shared experience become less relevant after the shift. 
However, de novo organizations lack industry-specific prior shared experience and thus would 
not suffer from decreased relevance of such experience after the regulatory regime shift.  
While we hypothesize that the regulatory regime shift will increase the hazard of 
mortality for spin-offs, we cannot unambiguously predict the effect of the regulatory regime shift 
on the survival of de novo organizations. Our argument, however, yields an unequivocal 
prediction when we compare how the de novo and the restructuring spin-offs are affected by the 
regulatory regime shift. We predict that de novo organizations will adapt better to the new 
environmental conditions than restructuring spin-offs that, in their majority, have been engaging 
in traditional activities before the regulatory regime shift. This suggests the following 
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hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. The regulatory regime shift will have a stronger negative effect on the 
survival of spin-offs from restructured state enterprises than on the survival of de novo 
organizations. 
Although their pre-founding experience predisposes restructuring spin-offs to engage in 
familiar activities, some of them may develop new routines as a result of experimenting with 
novel activities. Researchers argued that engaging in new activities forces organizations to 
develop new TMS (Bryant, 2014; Ren, Carley, & Argote, 2006). Performing new complex tasks 
requires organizational members to identify who has relevant knowledge and to learn how to 
integrate such knowledge. As a result, organizations acquire valuable experience of new TMS 
development that may boost their adaptive capacity (Argote & Ren, 2012). Correspondingly, we 
expect that the experience of engaging in new activities before the regulatory shift will help 
restructuring spin-offs to adapt to the environment after the regulatory change. Therefore, the 
argument about the disadvantages of restructuring spin-offs in the post-shift environment that 
underpins Hypothesis 3 will not apply to those restructuring spin-offs that engage in new 
activities before the regulatory regime shift. In other words, engaging in new activities is 
expected to reduce the risks associated with the inheritance originating in the prior experience of 
operating as a unit of a state enterprise. 
Hypothesis 5: Engaging in new activities before the regulatory regime shift will have a 
positive effect on the survival of spin-offs from restructured state enterprises after the 
regulatory regime shift.  
Whereas engaging in new activities before the regulatory regime shift might be beneficial 
for both restructuring spin-offs and de novo organizations, such experience is particularly critical 
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for boosting the survival chances of spin-offs originating from restructured state enterprises. 
Prior shared experience and established TMS create obstacles that make engaging in new 
activities more difficult for restructuring spin-offs than for de novo organizations. However, we 
expect that spin-offs will also benefit more from engaging in new activities compared to the de 
novo, for two reasons. First, the tendency of restructuring spin-offs to take advantage of the 
inherited routines and established TMS makes them particularly vulnerable to changes in the 
regulatory regime. This vulnerability can be alleviated as the result of experimenting with new 
activities. Among restructuring spin-offs, engaging in new activities is an important signal that 
they have been able to overcome the rigidity associated with routines developed through prior 
shared experience. However, among the de novo, engaging in new activities is not an indicator 
that distinguishes adaptive organizations from rigid organizations.  
Second, experimenting with new activities provides an opportunity for restructuring spin-
offs to modify existing TMS and to change their established routines, while de novo 
organizations experimenting with new activities do not change their established routines, they 
build them from scratch. The experience of changing established routines would be particularly 
relevant after the regulatory regime shift because this shift will force all organizations to 
transform the ways they operate. For these reasons, we expect that the survival advantages of 
engaging in new activities will be conditional on organizational origins. Specifically, we suggest:  
Hypothesis 6: Engaging in new activities before the regulatory regime shift will have a 
stronger positive effect on the survival after the shift for spin-offs from restructured state 
enterprises than for de novo organizations. 
Figures 1a and 1b depict our conceptual model and the hypothesized relationships. 
--- INSERT FIGURES 1A AND 1B ABOUT HERE --- 
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RESEARCH CONTEXT 
We tested our hypotheses using data on the Russian commercial banking industry over 
the 15 years following its inception in 1988. This empirical context is particularly advantageous 
for testing our hypotheses for three reasons. First, a large number of banks were founded and 
liquidated in Russia between 1988 and 2002, and the available records allowed us to trace the 
origins, the founding date, and the liquidation date (if applicable) for all these banks. Second, 
there is a stark contrast in the origins and the pre-founding experience between the de novo 
banks and the restructuring spin-offs created on the basis of the branches of the former Soviet 
banks. Third, the Russian banking industry experienced a major shift in the regulatory regime in 
1995.   
The Emergence of the Russian Commercial Banking Industry 
Before the emergence of commercial banking in 1988, banks in the Soviet Union 
operated under exclusive state control and served as an instrument for the centralized distribution 
of state funds. The system bore little resemblance to commercial banking. It was comprised of 
several giant banks, each specializing in a particular economic sector. The birth of the Russian 
commercial banking industry was marked by two events. The first was the adoption of the Law 
on Cooperatives in 1988, which permitted to set up commercial banks. This led to the emergence 
of de novo banks, which were start-ups created by individuals, enterprises, governmental 
agencies, or non-commercial organizations. These de novo banks could draw on the financial, 
social, and human capital of their founders, but they were created without involvement of the 
Soviet-era banks. The second event was the 1990 ruling by the Central Bank of Russia to 
transform the branches of the Soviet state banks into independent commercial banks by allowing 
the branch managers and employees to form new banks from their branches (Abarbanell & 
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Meyendorff, 1997). This event led to the creation of hundreds of restructuring spin-off banks that 
inherited the assets, liabilities, managers and employees of the former Soviet bank branches (see 
Appendix for information about prior employment of top managers at a sample spin-off bank).  
The Regulatory Regime Shift 
The first 15 years of the Russian commercial banking industry were characterized by 
high environmental uncertainty and volatility stemming from general macroeconomic instability. 
Prior to 1995, the reformist government mainly focused on privatization and market 
liberalization, paying only scant attention to the regulation of the banking industry. From 1988 to 
1991, the commercial banking was virtually unregulated, which resulted in the unbridled growth 
in the number of banks from 6 to 1,360. In 1991, the Central Bank of Russia formally assumed a 
role of the industry regulator, but its initial licensing policies were relatively liberal, the 
prudential regulations were lax, and the enforcement was poor. Consequently, the banking boom 
continued unchecked, with the number of banks expanding to 2,517 by the end of 1994.  
In 1995, the Russian government was forced to abandon its laissez-faire policies with 
regard to commercial banking and to resort to stricter regulations in order to gain control over the 
rampant inflation and chaotic financial markets (Barisitz, 2004). In July 1995, it introduced the 
currency corridor limiting the exchange rate fluctuations. The government’s commitment to non-
inflationary funding of the budget deficit decreased the inflation rate from 130 percent in 1995 to 
22 percent in 1996. The new government policies as well as the tightened regulations and 
licensing requirements of the Central Bank dramatically changed the business environment of the 
Russian banking industry. The number of banks had fallen to 2,029 by 1996 and to 1,600 by 
1998. The regulatory regime shift of 1995 was a “point of no return” that radically altered the 
conditions of operating in the banking industry.4  
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Before the regulatory regime shift, spin-off banks often made money through 
redistributing centrally-allocated funds to state enterprises served earlier by their parent Soviet 
banks. As long as this business model remained profitable, spin-off banks had limited motivation 
to engage in new activities to exploit opportunities created by market liberalization. In contrast, 
de novo banks lacked an established client base and had limited opportunities to distribute low-
interest loans funded by the Central Bank. They had to explore other opportunities and this 
prompted de novo banks to engage in new activities, such as arbitrage and intermediation in 
financial markets, international money transfers, and searching for new clients in the growing 
population of private enterprises.  
Anti-inflationary policies and tightened regulatory requirements introduced in 1995 
effectively eliminated the opportunities for making easy profits that banks used to exploit in the 
early 1990s. The Central Bank no longer provided loans on favorable conditions and the spin-
offs’ heavy reliance on the inherited client base created a problem of connected lending that 
compromised the loan portfolios of many spin-off banks with non-performing loans. Although 
the regulatory regime shift destroyed some sources of income that many de novo banks exploited 
before the shift, such as market arbitrage in the high-inflation economy, the development of 
financial markets and the growing demand for financial services created new opportunities for 
the banks. At the same time, the tightened monetary policy and stricter regulations posed threats 
to the survival of both the de novo and the spin-offs. These changing environmental conditions 
provide us with an opportunity to test our hypotheses about factors affecting the survival of de 
novo and spin-off banks.  
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METHODS 
Data 
Our data on organizational origins, founding date, size, location, and date and type of exit 
cover the entire population of commercial banks in Russia from its inception in 1988 until 2002. 
During this period, 3068 banks were founded, but by September 2002 only 1333 banks remained 
in operation. Our data on the registered capital cover 1178 banks founded by May 1991, and the 
data on the foreign correspondent accounts and the structure of loan portfolios at the end of 1994 
are available for 332 banks. The main sources of data for this study were the official registry of 
banks maintained by the Central Bank of Russia and the directories of Russian commercial banks 
compiled by the information agencies “Inform-servis”, “Intelbridge”, and “Konsultbankir.” 
Dependent Variable 
In the analysis of survival5, our dependent variable is the hazard rate of liquidation. The 
hazard rate h for firm i and time t can be expressed as  
hit = lim  
        dt→0 
Pr (t ≤ T < t + dt | T ≥ t) 
dt 
where T is waiting time until the event occurrence and Pr (t ≤ T < t + dt | T ≥ t) is the conditional 
probability that the event will occur between t and t + dt given that it has not occurred before t. 
In principle, there are two types of exit from an organizational population: through 
liquidation and through acquisition. Following Mitchell (1994) and Fortune and Mitchell (2012), 
we recognize that the characteristics that make organizations likely to fail may significantly 
differ from those that make them likely to be acquired. In our analysis, we focus on exits through 
liquidation because they represent “true failures,” while both successful and unsuccessful banks 
may become targets of acquisition (Wheelock & Wilson, 2000). Out of the total 1727 exits from 
the industry during the observation period, 1370 were liquidations and 357 were acquisitions.  
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Independent Variables 
Organizational origins. Organizational origins was captured by spin-off dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 for spin-off banks founded on the basis of one or more branches of a 
former Soviet state bank and the value of 0 for de novo banks created from scratch and not 
traceable to any of the former Soviet banks.  
Regulatory regime shift. To test the effect of changes in the regulatory environment, we 
differentiated between the periods before and after the regulatory regime shift by using the 
dummy variable post-shift period, which takes the value of 0 for the years 1988-1995 and the 
value of 1 for the years 1996-2002. We include the year of the shift (1995) in the pre-shift period 
because the effects of the regulatory regime shift on survival would not be immediate.  
Bank activities. To gauge the engagement in new activities by the restructuring spin-offs 
before the regulatory regime shift, we use two measures: (1) the number of foreign financial 
institutions with which the bank had correspondent accounts in 1994 (variable foreign 
correspondents) and (2) the share of loans to enterprises with private ownership in the bank’s 
total loan portfolio at the end of 1994 (variable loans to private enterprises). The number of 
foreign correspondents indicates the extent of bank’s involvement in international financial 
transactions, a novel activity for Russian banks, as they were not allowed to conduct any 
international operations prior to the fall of the “iron curtain.” The proportion of loans to private 
enterprises in the bank’s loan portfolio reflects the extent to which the spin-off banks switched 
from serving their traditional clientele of state enterprises to serving the clients from the 
emerging private sector. Working with private enterprises implied a new set of activities, 
associated with risk evaluation, monitoring of financial stability, and enforcement of loan 
agreements. To test whether engaging in the new activities before the regulatory regime shift 
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affected the spin-offs’ survival after the shift, we use two interaction variables: (1) foreign 
correspondents * spin-off and (2) loans to private enterprises * spin-off. 
Control Variables 
Competitive Environment. To control for the effects of the competitive environment, we 
use three variables: (1) contemporaneous competition intensity, calculated as the total number of 
commercial banks in a particular year divided by 100; (2) competition intensity squared; and (3) 
competition at founding, calculated as the number of banks in the year of founding divided by 
100. To capture the linear effect of time on the hazard rate of liquidation we use variable industry 
age, specified as the number of years that elapsed since the birth of the industry in 1988. We 
employ two dummy variables for location, Moscow and St. Petersburg, to control for the 
differences in the competitive environment between Russia’s two largest cities and the rest of the 
country (Johnson, 2000).  
Organizational Characteristics.  We control for organizational size, measured by the 
bank’s owned capital. An increase of the owned capital is a key indicator of the bank’s growth, 
and the regulatory restrictions on different types of assets and liabilities are determined based on 
the bank’s owned capital. We also include the variable organizational age as a control, measured 
as the number of years since founding. To control for the impact of foreign ownership, we use 
the respective dummy variable, which identifies banks with foreign shareholders. The descriptive 
statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables are presented in Table 1. 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
Method of Estimation 
We estimated the effect of covariates on the hazard rate of liquidation by using survival 
analysis. Our initial examination demonstrated that the Weibull model provided better fit for the 
Legacy of the State 22 
data than alternative models we tested, including Gompertz, exponential, lognormal, and 
loglogistic. The Weibull model defines baseline hazard h0 as a function of time t as follows: 
h0(t) = ρλ(λt)ρ–1 
where ρ is a shape parameter estimated from the data and λ is a scale parameter. This model can 
be generalized to include the effects of covariates: 
h(tj) = h0(t)g(xj) , where g(xj) = exp(xjβ) 
Depending on the value of ρ, the hazard rate may increase (ρ>1), decrease (0< ρ<1), or 
remain constant over time (ρ=1). We estimate all the models using STATA. 
RESULTS 
To test Hypothesis 1 that spin-offs from restructured state enterprises are less likely to 
engage in new activities than de novo organizations, we assessed the banks’ engagement in two 
new activities: international financial transactions and lending to private enterprises. Since the 
disclosure of information on foreign correspondent accounts and loan portfolio structure was not 
mandatory, not all banks reported this information and our analysis focused on 332 banks, for 
which the relevant data were available. As we expected, the banks disclosing non-mandatory 
information (including information on their activities) on average were larger compared with the 
population averages. We also found a higher proportion of Moscow banks among those 
disclosing information about their activities. To account for the possibility that organizational 
size and location may be related to the choice of activities, we controlled for these variables in 
our analysis. 
To examine the effect of organizational origins on the propensity to provide international 
transaction services and to lend to private businesses, we regressed the variables “foreign 
correspondents” and “loans to private enterprises” on organizational origins while controlling 
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for other important organizational characteristics. The results, presented in Table 2, show that 
tracing the origins to restructured state enterprises was negatively associated with opening 
foreign correspondent accounts and with lending to private enterprises. These findings provide 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
To test Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 that link the hazard of bank liquidation to bank origins and 
the regulatory regime shift, we conducted survival analysis on the entire population of banks 
founded in Russia since 1988. The results are reported in Table 3. To find out if spin-offs had 
survival advantages over de novo banks before the regulatory regime shift, we censored the 
observation period in 1995 and estimated the impact of spin-off origins on the hazard rate of 
liquidation for the 1988-1995 period (see Models 1 and 2 in Table 3).6  The coefficient for spin-
off dummy is negative and significant, indicating the lower risk of liquidation for the spin-offs 
than for the de novo banks before the shift, as predicted by Hypothesis 2.  
--- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
To test Hypothesis 3 that the mortality hazard for spin-offs would increase after the 
regulatory regime shift, we split our dataset into the subsets based on different origins (as 
suggested in the prior research, e.g., Swanson, 2002) and limited the analysis to the 
subpopulation of spin-off banks (see Models 3 and 4 in Table 3).7 The positive coefficient for the 
dummy variable post-shift period indicates that, during the post-shift (1996-2002) period, the 
spin-off banks experienced a higher risk of liquidation than during the pre-shift (1988-1995) 
period. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 3.  
To test Hypothesis 4 that the impact of the regulatory regime shift should have a stronger 
negative effect on the survival of spin-offs than on the survival of de novo organizations, we 
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conducted two sets of analysis. In the first set, we estimated the same models as in the analysis of 
spin-offs above, but this time for the de novo banks only (see Models 5 and 6 in Table 3) and 
then compared the results. A marginally significant negative effect of the post-shift period 
dummy on the hazard rate of liquidation of de novo banks (in Model 6) is in contrast to the 
significant positive effect of the post-shift period dummy on the hazard rate of liquidation of 
spin-off banks (in Model 4), leading us to conclude that the shift had a more detrimental effect 
on the survival of spin-off banks, as predicted by Hypothesis 4. Transforming the coefficients 
into hazard ratios (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004) reveals that before the regulatory regime 
shift the risk of liquidation for the de novo banks was three times higher than for the spin-offs 
and that the shift increased the risk for the spin-offs 2.7 times, while decreasing it for the de novo 
by 30 percent. 
In the second set of analyses testing Hypothesis 4, we estimated the significance of 
interaction between spin-offs and post-shift period variables using the data for the full population 
over the entire observation period (see Models 7 and 8 in Table 3). Model 7 is the baseline model 
with dummies for the organizational origins (the variable spin-offs) and the regulatory regime 
shift (the variable post-shift period). This model demonstrates that, overall, the spin-offs had 
survival advantages vis-à-vis the de novo banks, and the hazard of liquidation after the shift was 
lower than before the shift. The period after the regulatory regime shift covers seven years, and, 
while the initial effect of the shift was disruptive, the regulatory changes introduced in 1995 and 
aimed at stabilizing the industry did eventually achieve the desired effect and led to the reduction 
in the hazard rate of liquidation. Model 8 adds the interaction variable spin-off*post-shift period. 
The significant positive coefficient for this variable indicates that, controlling for the main effect 
of organizational origins and the regulatory regime shift, the spin-offs were more adversely 
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affected by the shift than the de novo. This result, obtained from the data for the full population 
of banks, is consistent with the earlier comparison of the effects of the regulatory regime shift on 
the de novo and the spin-off subpopulations, thus lending further support to Hypothesis 4.  
The results for the control variables reflecting organizational characteristics in Table 3 
show that organizational age, organizational size, and foreign ownership had consistently 
negative effect on the hazard rate of liquidation. The positive coefficient for Moscow indicates 
that the central location was associated with the higher hazard rate of liquidation. Moscow banks 
experienced particularly strong competition because more than 40 percent of all Russian banks 
were registered in Moscow. In the full population analysis (Models 7 and 8), the positive 
coefficients for competition intensity and competition at founding suggest that the hazard of 
liquidation increased as the result of more intense competition and that competitive conditions at 
the time of founding had a lasting effect on survival. The results of the subpopulation analyses 
(Models 3 through 6) suggest that the de novo banks were more adversely affected by intense 
competition than the spin-off banks: competition intensity, competition at founding, and Moscow 
location significantly increased the hazard rate for de novo, but not for spin-off banks. This is 
consistent with our argument that the spin-off banks served the established client base and, 
hence, were partly protected from competition.   
We conducted a supplementary analysis to check whether the differences in the life 
chances between de novo and spin-off banks can be attributed to the differences in the resource 
endowments. We searched for data on endowment with financial resources at founding and were 
able to obtain archival data on the registered capital of banks as of May 1991. Since all banks 
were in operation for less than three years at that time, we used registered capital in 1991 as a 
proxy for the capital at founding. Our analysis of these data showed that there were no 
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significant differences in the registered capital between de novo and spin-off banks. We 
replicated our test of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 with the added control for registered capital using 
data available for 1178 banks that were in operation by May 1991. The results obtained for this 
subpopulation were similar to the results obtained for the full population of 3068 banks as 
reported in Table 3. We also found that the registered capital in 1991 had a significant negative 
effect on the risk of failure during the pre-shift period. We can conclude that the initial resource 
endowments matter but the effects of organizational origins on survival cannot be explained by 
the initial resource endowments alone. 
To test Hypothesis 5 that those spin-offs that engaged in the new activities before the 
shift would have survival advantages after the shift, we conducted the analysis with a sample of 
banks that operated at the end of 1994 (i.e., right before the regulatory regime shift) and 
examined the effects of various covariates on the survival of these banks after the shift. The 
results are provided in Table 4.  
--- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE --- 
The results for our baseline model (Model 1) show no statistically significant difference 
between the spin-offs and the de novo banks in the hazard rate of liquidation after 1995. This 
indicates that, after the shift, the spin-offs no longer had survival advantages. The positive effect 
of organizational size on the risk of liquidation after 1995 may be attributed to the fact that large 
banks had a higher exposure to interbank and foreign currency loans and this made them 
especially vulnerable in the turbulent financial markets of the late 1990s. The negative effect of 
foreign ownership on liquidation after 1995 reflects the support provided by foreign investors to 
banks experiencing financial difficulties. The effect of competition intensity is relatively weak in 
this and subsequent models, which may be due to a decline in the total number of operating 
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banks after 1995. 
In Model 2 we added the three variables that reflect the proportion of loans allocated to 
three categories of borrowers: state enterprises, private enterprises, and individuals. In Model 3 
we added a variable for the interaction between the organizational origins and the proportion of 
loans allocated to private enterprises (spin-off*loans to private enterprises). The coefficient for 
this interaction variable is negative and significant, indicating that, controlling for the main 
effects of organizational origins and loan portfolio structure, the spin-off banks with a larger 
proportion of loans allocated to private enterprises before the regulatory regime shift had better 
survival chances after the shift. In Model 4 we tested the effect of having foreign correspondent 
accounts and find that the spin-off banks that had more foreign correspondent accounts before 
the regulatory regime shift had a lower hazard of liquidation after the shift. Finally, Model 5 
includes both interaction variables; the results are similar to those obtained in Models 3 and 4 for 
each interaction variable considered separately. 
To test Hypothesis 6 that spin-offs from restructured state enterprises benefit more from 
engaging in new activities before the regulatory regime shift than do the de novo, we use 
margins analysis. The results of this analysis demonstrate that one standard deviation increase in 
the number of foreign correspondents has a significant negative effect on the risk of liquidation 
for restructuring spin-offs (Prob > χ2 = 0.99). Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the 
proportion of loans to private enterprises also has a significant negative effect on the risk of 
liquidation of restructuring spin-offs (Prob > χ2 = 0.99). In contrast, for the de novo, one standard 
deviation increase in the number of foreign correspondents does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the risk of liquidation (Prob > χ2 = 0.25) and the same holds for one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of loans to private enterprises (Prob > χ2 = 0.80). These 
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findings indicate that engaging in new activities before the regulatory regime shift was critical 
for the post-shift survival of restructuring spin-offs. In contrast, de novo organizations were able 
to adapt to a new regulatory regime even if they did not have extensive involvement in new 
activities before the regulatory regime shift. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
By building on the literature on prior shared experience (Fern et al., 2012; Kor, 2003; 
Reagans et al., 2005; Zheng, 2012), we have sought to explain how organizational origins (spin-
offs versus de novo) affected the activities and survival of Russian banks. We found that spin-off 
banks had a tendency to engage in the activities that were similar to those performed by their 
parent organizations, whereas de novo banks were more likely to engage in the new activities. 
The tendency to engage in familiar activities contributed to the higher survival chances of the 
restructuring spin-offs vis-à-vis the de novo before the regulatory regime shift, but had a 
detrimental effect on the spin-offs’ ability to adapt after the radical change in the regulatory 
environment. Some restructuring spin-offs, however, did engage in new activities before the shift 
and, as a result, fared better than other restructuring spin-offs after the shift. We also found that 
the positive effect of engaging in new activities before the regulatory regime shift on survival 
was more pronounced for the restructuring spin-offs than for de novo banks. 
 This study makes several important theoretical contributions. It demonstrates that prior 
shared experience may have both beneficial and detrimental implications. We rely on TMS 
theory to explain the impact of prior shared experience on activity choice and survival. While 
early research focused exclusively on TMS benefits, researchers have begun to acknowledge 
boundary conditions for deriving such benefits in more recent studies (Ren & Argote, 2011). In 
particular, several studies have demonstrated that the value of TMS diminishes when teams or 
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organizations have to perform a different task (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; Edwards et al., 
2006; Zheng, 2012). We suggest that TMS may also affect the choice of tasks to be performed 
(what we describe as a choice of activities) and organizations have a natural tendency to perform 
familiar tasks. This allows to maximize benefits from the existing TMS but has a detrimental 
effect on organizational ability to adapt to environmental changes that sooner or later force 
organizations to perform different tasks.  
In their review of research on TMS, Ren and Argote expressed a conjecture that 
performance benefits of new ventures that were created from existing firms “are due to the 
operation of transactive memory systems that members developed in the parent firm.” (2011: 
222). We use this idea in our study to explain why pre-founding experience of spin-offs initially 
has a positive survival effect that, however, disappears over time (Carroll et al., 1996; Ganco & 
Agarwal, 2009). The TMS perspective can also explain why prior shared experiences of team 
members would have different impact than individual experiences of founders. When separated 
from their teams, individuals would not be able to carry collective cognitive models with them 
the same way they carry individual expertise acquired in parent organizations. 
The concept of TMS helps us to emphasize that collective experience of working together 
has the effect that goes beyond the effect of individual work experiences at state enterprises. In 
fact, some of the individuals with prior work experience in Soviet banks were also hired by de 
novo banks. What differentiated spin-off banks from de novo banks was extensive industry-
specific prior shared experience (Fern et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2016) of organizational 
members working together in the branches of a Soviet bank before these branches were 
converted into stand-alone spin-off banks. This transformation preserved TMS developed within 
branches of Soviet banks, thus enabling the re-enactment of familiar routines. This implies that 
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prior shared work experience in state enterprises can strengthen the “legacy of the state” beyond 
the effect of individual experiences of employment in state enterprises.    
By examining the survival of spin-offs from restructured state banks, we expand the 
scope of research on the survival implications of organizational origins. Studying spin-offs from 
state enterprises is important not only because they represent a sizeable portion of all spin-offs, 
especially in countries that have privatized their state assets, but also because spin-offs from 
restructured state enterprises are founded with different motivation compared with frequently 
studied entrepreneurial spin-offs (Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003). A number of studies reported 
that entrepreneurial spin-offs have survival advantages over de novo start-ups (Agarwal et al., 
2004; Klepper, 2009). However, the analysis of spin-offs from restructured state enterprises 
demonstrates that the survival advantages attributed in these past studies to pre-founding 
experience may be partially due to entrepreneurial intent to explore new business opportunities. 
Our findings suggest that, in the absence of an intent to explore new business opportunities, 
restructuring spin-offs exhibit a general tendency to pursue familiar activities that provide 
opportunities to leverage what they inherited from their parent organizations. 
We demonstrate the effects of pre-founding experience that have not been described in 
prior studies and would not be anticipated based on the existing literature. Some researchers 
argue that organizations with pre-founding experience are better prepared to deal with 
environmental turbulence (Chen et al., 2012; Ganco & Agarwal, 2009) but others suggest that 
“institutional upheaval” would be particularly damaging for institutionally-embedded 
organizations that would have to unlearn inappropriate capabilities (Newman, 2000). We find 
that spin-offs from state banks were able to adapt successfully to the turbulence associated with 
market liberalization in the early 1990s, but have difficulties adapting to new rules of the game 
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introduced as the next step of the market reforms. We also show that restructuring spin-offs 
benefit more than de novo organizations from engaging in new activities before the regulatory 
regime shift. Although the importance of new activities in organizational adaptation to different 
environmental conditions has been acknowledged in prior research already, we suggest that 
engaging in new activities is more important for boosting adaptive capacity when organizational 
members have extensive prior shared experience. 
By focusing on organizations originating from state enterprises, our study contributes to 
the literature on market reforms (Filatotchev et al., 2003; Lyles et al., 2004; Tihanyi & Hegarty, 
2007; Yiu, Hoskisson, Bruton, & Lu, 2014; Zahra et al., 2000) and, in particular, to the debate 
about the relative importance of de novo and privatized enterprises in the process of revitalizing 
former state-controlled economies (Estrin et al., 2005; Wachtel, 1999). The overwhelming 
majority of research on market reforms focused on the effect of privatization and compared 
performance of privatized companies and those remaining under state control (Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002; Megginson & Netter, 2001). At the same time, few studies compared the 
performance of privatized companies with the performance of new ventures (D’Souza et al., 
2017). Our study demonstrates that, on average, restructuring spin-offs are much less 
entrepreneurial than de novo organizations even though engaging in new activities can 
significantly boost their long-term survival chances. 
Our findings also contribute to the relatively unexplored area of the survival outcomes of 
institutional entrepreneurship (Pacheco et al., 2010). If we consider the engagement in new 
activities prior to the regulatory shift as an instance of institutional entrepreneurship, such as the 
initiation or active implementation of changes that diverge from existing institutions (Battilana, 
Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009), then our findings for de novo organizations reveal the risks of 
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institutional entrepreneurship. At the same time, our results suggest that institutional 
entrepreneurship may bring long-term survival benefits for the incumbents (restructuring spin-
offs), reflecting the advantages of organizational hybridization (Battilana, Besharov, & 
Mitzinneck, 2017). Organizational hybrids combine elements of different institutional orders; 
this reflects and fosters their adaptation to competing environmental demands.  For restructuring 
spin-offs, combining traditional and new activities before the regime shift would indicate an 
underlying “structured flexibility” (Smith & Besharov, 2018) in dealing with environmental 
complexity that can enhance survival chances. 
One limitation of our study is that we explored relatively few activities. Another 
limitation is that we did not study systematically the factors that may predict which restructuring 
spin-offs are more likely to overcome the inertia associated with the inherited organizational 
routines and to engage in new activities. How the characteristics of restructuring spin-offs impact 
their choice of activities is a question for further research. Another question for future research is 
whether the pattern observed in our study is likely to be found in the context of different types of 
environmental changes. In such closely regulated industry as banking, organizations are deeply 
affected by radical changes in the regulatory environment (Tihanyi & Hegarty, 2007). In 
comparison, a less regulated industry may be more affected by a technological revolution that 
causes a “competence-destroying discontinuity” (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Future research 
is needed to test whether our hypotheses hold for radical changes in business environment 
produced by technological revolutions or political uprisings. Finally, it would be important to 
study the dynamics of TMS in spin-off organizations at the micro-level to explore how TMS are 
affected by separation from a parent organization and by engagement in new activities. 
In conclusion, the ability of organizations to respond to changing market conditions is 
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considered essential for their survival. Yet, if an organization only acts in response to an 
environmental change, it will lag behind those of its rivals that start experimenting with new 
activities before the need for change becomes evident. Engaging in proactive experimentation 
with new activities is challenging because the constraining effect of prior experience and because 
the return on the familiar activities is often higher than the return on the new activities. With the 
appeal of focusing on familiar activities and the uncertainty surrounding the timing of an 
environmental shift, many organizations are caught unprepared to deal with environmental 
changes. The findings of this study suggest that the ability of organizations to successfully adapt 
to environmental changes is rooted in proactive experimentation with new activities and such 
experimentation is particularly critical for organizations originating from state enterprises. 
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NOTES
1 While we focus on restructuring that results in creating spin-offs, other forms of restructuring 
have been described in market transition studies including downsizing, changing product portfolios, and 
creating business groups (Filatotchev et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2003; Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005). 
2 When considering changes in the environmental conditions, it is important to distinguish between 
an environmental shift (Cho & Shen, 2007) and an environmental jolt (Sine & David, 2003). A shift 
implies that the environmental conditions permanently change, while a jolt refers to some temporary 
disturbance after which the pre-disturbance environmental conditions can be restored. 
3 Notice that for the purpose of this study, we define new activities as activities that are new for the 
industry rather than for a particular organization. 
4 During the 1990s, the Russian banking industry experienced several major crises, including those 
caused by the rouble devaluation in October 1994 and by the government default on its bonds in August 
1998. These crises contributed to a high turnover in the industry ranks and attracted extensive media 
attention, but they did not have a profound impact on how banks operated. In contrast, the fundamental 
changes in economic policies and industry regulation that occurred in 1995, while being less noticeable to 
the general public, redefined the “rules of the game” and had lasting consequences for the industry. 
5 Our focus on survival as an outcome variable has a number of advantages. First, over the years, a 
number of studies focused on the effect organizational origins on survival and we can evaluate the 
findings of our study relative to this body of literature. Second, other organizational outcomes, such as 
financial performance, would be affected by idiosyncratic characteristics of policies that regulated 
financial reporting in the Russian banking industry. Third, our focus on survival ensures that we have 
comprehensive and reliable data, which would not be affected by the problem of missing financial reports 
and by tax avoidance tactics. 
6 By terminating our analysis period earlier, we do not introduce biases in our analysis (as would be 
the case if we were to start our analysis period after 1988 thus creating left truncation). 
7 Note that the de novo banks were still included in the count for the competition intensity 
variables. We did, however, remove the control variable industry age to avoid collinearity, because all 
spin-off banks had been founded in the early 1990s and their organizational age was thus highly 
correlated with the industry age. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations a 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Competition intensity 18.88 5.13                
2 
Competition intensity 
squared 
382.81 186.62 0.99               
3 
Competition at 
founding 
15.77 7.29 0.17 0.14              
4 Industry age 8.86 3.34 -0.20 -0.26 0.36             
5 Organizational size 0.27 0.23 -0.07 -0.08 0.15 0.21            
6 Organizational age 3.98 3.11 -0.26 -0.31 -0.16 0.82 0.12           
7 Moscow 0.38 0.49 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.17 0.32 -0.01          
8 St Petersburg 0.03 0.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.13         
9 Foreign ownership 0.08 0.27 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.03        
10 Spin-off 0.27 0.44 -0.10 -0.10 -0.51 -0.21 -0.18 0.08 -0.40 -0.08 -0.08       
11 Post-shift period 0.51 0.50 -0.29 -0.36 0.28 0.84 0.18 0.70 0.14 0.02 0.07 -0.16      
12 
Spin-off * Post-shift 
period 
0.10 0.30 -0.08 -0.10 -0.28 0.26 -0.06 0.45 -0.21 -0.04 -0.02 0.55 0.33     
13 Loans to SOEs 25.75 24.95 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.25 -0.04 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.14    
14 
Loans to private 
enterprises 
59.88 27.92 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.25 0.05 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 -0.14 -0.76   
15 Loans to individuals 7.66 10.50 0.04 0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.19 -0.04 -0.21 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.17  
16 Foreign correspondents 6.18 10.95 -0.05 -0.04 -0.25 -0.05 0.26 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.27 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 
a Correlations above .03 and below -.03 are significant at p<.05 
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Table 2  
The Effects of Bank Origins on Foreign Correspondent Accounts and Loans to Private Enterprises as of the End of 1994 a 
 Loans to private enterprises  Foreign correspondents 
Variables Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
      
Registered capital  -1.96 
(1.52) 
-0.83 
(1.56) 
 2.15** 
(0.52) 
2.57** 
(0.53) 
      St Petersburg 12.05 
(10.14) 
5.07 
(10.36) 
 5.52 
(2.98) 
2.98 
(3.06) 
      Moscow 13.59** 
(3.85) 
6.78 
(4.60) 
 3.51** 
(1.30) 
0.93 
(1.54) 
      Number of branches -0.54* 
(0.26) 
-0.50 
(0.26) 
 0.24** 
(0.09) 
0.27** 
(0.09) 
      Foreign ownership -1.70 
(5.22) 
-1.58 
(5.16) 
 6.65** 
(1.72) 
6.57** 
(1.70) 
      Spin-off  -10.99** 
(4.18) 
  -4.29** 
(1.42) 
      Constant 60.21** 
(3.85) 
54.50** 
(4.38) 
 -2.12 
(1.30) 
-4.35** 
(1.48) 
 
            R sq.  0.10 0.13  0.25 0.28 
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses, N = 308. 
*p<0.05  
** p<0.01 
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Table 3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Organizational Mortality for the Russian Banks a 
 1988-1995, all banks 1988-2002, spin-offs only 1988-2002, de novo only 1988-2002, all banks 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         Competition intensity -0.55 
(0.38) 
-0.32 
(0.41) 
-2.71** 
(0.37) 
-3.50** 
(0.52) 
0.41** 
(0.11) 
0.70** 
(0.18) 
1.11 ** 
(0.16) 
1.09 ** 
(0.16) 
         Competition intensity 
squared 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.00) 
         Competition at founding -0.69** 
(0.09) 
-0.62** 
(0.08) 
-0.76** 
(0.07) 
-0.82** 
(0.07) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.06 ** 
(0.02) 
0.09 ** 
(0.02) 
         Industry age 4.39** 
(0.42) 
3.87** 
(0.41) 
  -0.01 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
         Organizational size  -59.94** 
(6.26) 
-59.06** 
(6.26) 
-22.27** 
(2.54) 
-22.35** 
(2.55) 
-14.57** 
(0.84) 
-14.54** 
(0.84) 
-15.99** 
(0.82) 
-15.80** 
(0.81) 
         Organizational age  -9.75** 
(0.58) 
-9.16** 
(0.57) 
-15.49** 
(0.88) 
-15.81** 
(0.89) 
-2.87** 
(0.13) 
-2.86** 
(0.13) 
-2.70 ** 
(0.12) 
-2.79 ** 
(0.12) 
         Moscow  0.65** 
(0.12) 
0.43** 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(0.27) 
0.38 
(0.27) 
0.31** 
(0.06) 
0.31** 
(0.06) 
0.33 ** 
(0.06) 
0.31 ** 
(0.06) 
         St Petersburg  -0.31 
(0.51) 
-0.57 
(0.51) 
-24.72 
(22624) 
-23.59 
(12891) 
-0.41 
(0.21) 
-0.41 
(0.21) 
-0.42 * 
(0.21) 
-0.43 * 
(0.21) 
         Foreign ownership  -14.57 
(985.42) 
-14.03 
(684.61) 
0.41 
(0.60) 
0.41 
(0.60) 
-0.86** 
(0.23) 
-0.86** 
(0.23) 
-0.82 ** 
(0.21) 
-0.79 ** 
(0.21) 
         Spin-off  -1.27** 
(0.21) 
    -0.63 ** 
(0.08) 
-2.32 ** 
(0.20) 
         Post-shift period    1.00* 
(0.46) 
 -0.35+ 
(0.18) 
-0.33 * 
(0.17) 
-1.01 ** 
(0.17) 
Spin-off * Post-shift 
period 
       2.48 ** 
(0.21) 
         Log likelihood -132.69 -110.46 250.21 252.56 -556.89 -554.99 -733.03 -640.67 
Number of banks 2924 2924 786 786 2280 2280 3068 3068 
Number of failures 324 324 258 258 1112 1112 1370 1370 
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses; +p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01; all models include intercept terms but their coefficients are not reported 
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Table 4 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Organizational Mortality after the Regulatory Regime 
Shift for Banks with Data on Loan Portfolios and Foreign Correspondent Accounts a 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Competition intensity 0.65 
(0.42) 
0.78 
(0.47) 
0.78 
(0.47) 
0.77 
(0.47) 
0.77 
(0.47) 
Competition intensity sq. -0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
Competition at founding -0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
Organizational size 
(1994) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
Organizational age -0.29 
(0.44) 
-0.36 
(0.51) 
-0.42 
(0.52) 
-0.18 
(0.53) 
-0.27 
(0.53) 
Moscow 0.05 
(0.17) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
-0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
St Petersburg -0.58 
(0.48) 
-0.48 
(0.61) 
-0.59 
(0.61) 
-0.45 
(0.61) 
-0.57 
(0.61) 
Foreign ownership -1.37** 
(0.30) 
-1.48** 
(0.36) 
-1.50** 
(0.36) 
-1.39** 
(0.35) 
-1.42** 
(0.35) 
Industry age -0.21 
(0.49) 
-0.09 
(0.56) 
-0.03 
(0.57) 
-0.28 
(0.58) 
-0.19 
(0.58) 
Spin-off -0.32 
(0.18) 
-0.35 
(0.21) 
0.46 
(0.43) 
-0.16 
(0.23) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
Loans to private 
enterprises 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Loans to SOEs 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Loans to individuals 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Spin-off*Loans to 
private enterprises 
  
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
Foreign 
correspondents 
   
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Spin-off*Foreign 
correspondents 
   
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
Constant 419.54 
(984.94) 
183.25 
(1124.47) 
50.37 
(1130.86) 
554.51 
(1145.36) 
368.92 
(1147. 81) 
Log likelihood -450.49 -351.85 -349.56 -346.59 -344.07 
Number of banks 414 332 332 326 326 
Number of failures 195 154 154 154 154 
a Loan portfolios and foreign correspondent accounts as of the end of 1994. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. 
*p<0.05  
** p<0.01 
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Figure 1a 
Hypotheses that compare restructuring spin-offs with de novo organizations 
 
 
 
Figure 1b 
Hypotheses about conditions affecting survival of restructuring spin-offs 
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APPENDIX 
Information about prior employment of top managers of a spin-off bank and a de novo bank 
Spin-off bank: Top management team of Bezhitsa-bank in 1994 
(spun off from PSB state bank in 1990) 
De novo bank: Top management team of Bizon-kapital in 1994 
(founded in 1992) 
Head of Governing Body: Grishkova L.E.  
(previous workplace: Bezhitskij branch of PSB state bank) 
 
Deputy Head of Governing Body: Vorontsova L.D.  
(previous workplace: Bezhitskij branch of PSB state bank) 
 
Deputy Head of Governing Body: Izotova G.V.  
(previous workplace: Bezhitskij branch of PSB state bank) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Krotov A.R.  
(previous workplace: Bryansk Electromechanical Plant) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Kuznetsova T.A.  
(previous workplace: Bezhitskij branch of PSB state bank) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Prudnikova T.I.  
(previous workplace: Bezhitskij branch of PSB state bank) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Sidorenkova A.V.  
(previous workplace: Bezhitskij branch of PSB state bank) 
 
Head of Governing Body: Bazhenov A.V.  
(previous workplace: Marijskij Polytechnic Institute and “Ayar” 
commercial bank) 
 
First Deputy Head of Governing Body: Trunin V.G.  
(previous workplace: Khabarovsk Polytechnic Institute and 
cooperative “Kurs”) 
 
Deputy Head of Governing Body: Bajbarodina V.G.  
(previous workplace: Khabarovsk Institute of National Economy) 
 
Deputy Head of Governing Body: Gur’ev V.V.  
(previous workplace: Dalnevostochnij Science and Research Institute) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Balakhonova M.I.  
(previous workplace: “Regionalnoe Razvitie” commercial bank and 
Khabarovsk Department of the Central Bank of Russia) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Peskova T.D.  
(previous workplace: Small Enterprises Development Center of 
Khabarovsk Municipal Government) 
 
Member of Governing Body: Pytnev V.V.  
(previous workplace: Khabarovsk Polytechnic Institute) 
 
Source: Intelbridge directory of Russian banks, 1994. 
 
